Dathematics: A Meta-isomorphic Version of 'Standard' Mathematics based
  on Proper Classes by Gomez-Ramirez, Danny A. J.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
4.
02
43
9v
1 
 [m
ath
.L
O]
  6
 A
pr
 20
18
DATHEMATICS: A META-ISOMORPHIC VERSION OF ‘STANDARD’
MATHEMATICS BASED ON PROPER CLASSES
DANNY ARLEN DE JESU´S GO´MEZ-RAMI´REZ
ABSTRACT. We show that the (typical) quantitative considerations about
proper (as too big) and small classes are just tangential facts regarding the
consistency of Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory with Choice. Effectively, we will
construct a first-order logic theory D-ZFC (Dual theory of ZFC) strictly based
on (a particular sub-collection of) proper classes with a corresponding spe-
cial membership relation, such that ZFC and D-ZFC are meta-isomorphic
frameworks (together with a more general dualization theorem). More
specifically, for any standard formal definition, axiom and theorem that can
be described and deduced in ZFC, there exists a corresponding ‘dual’ ver-
sion in D-ZFC and vice versa. Finally, we prove the meta-fact that (classic)
mathematics (i.e. theories grounded on ZFC) and dathematics (i.e. dual
theories grounded on D-ZFC) are meta-isomorphic. This shows that proper
classes are as suitable (primitive notions) as sets for building a foundational
framework for mathematics.
Mathematical Subject Classification (2010): 03B10, 03E99
Keywords: proper classes, NBG Set Theory, equiconsistency, meta-isomorphism.
INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of the twentieth century there was a particular interest
among mathematicians and logicians in finding a general, coherent and con-
sistent formal framework for mathematics. One of the main reasons for this
was the discovery of paradoxes in Cantor’s Naive Set Theory and related sys-
tems, e.g., Russell’s, Cantor’s, Burati-Forti’s, Richard’s, Berry’s and Grelling’s
paradoxes [12], [4], [14], [3], [6] and [11]. In particular, Russell’s para-
dox offered one of the strongest motivations for developing new and more
restricted set-theoretical frameworks. Specifically, the seminal works of E.
Zermelo [16]; A. Fraenkel [5]; J. von Newmann [15]; P. Bernays [1], [2];
R. Robinson [13]; and K. Goedel [7], [8], [9]; allow for the construction
of the most accepted and well-known logical formal frameworks of Zermelo-
Fraenkel Set Theory with Choice (ZFC) [10], and more generally Von Newmann-
Bernays-Goedel Set Theory (NBG) [12, Ch. 4].
Now, in the context of NBG set theory the essential starting point was the
intuitive idea that a kind of new entity called a ‘proper class’ should be formed
from the general collection of all sets, because this special collection was ‘too
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big’. So, the general framework of NBG set theory is based on the primitive
notion of class and the primitive relation of membership among classes. In
addition, the notion of set is captured by restricting the classes to those who
belong to at least another class. So, in this way one can guarantee with a suit-
able axiomatization that such classes remain small enough in order to prevent
contradictory statements like Russell’s paradox, and to fulfill the main axioms
of ZFC set theory required for constructing the most fundamental mathemat-
ical theories e.g. analysis, (differential and algebraic) geometry, (abstract)
algebra and number theory.
In addition, an implicit working principle in NBG set theory is that small
classes (or ‘sets’) are more suitable objects to start and work with. On the
other hand, proper classes are just too big and formally ‘too dangerous’ in
order to be able to ground any consistent and enough general mathematical
theory.
In this paper, we will mainly show that these classic quantitative consid-
erations about proper and small classes are just tangential facts regarding
the consistency of ZFC set theory. Effectively, we will construct a logic the-
ory D-ZFC (Dual theory of ZFC set theory) strictly based on (a particular
sub-collection of) proper classes with a corresponding special membership
relation, such that ZFC and D-ZFC are meta-isomorphic frameworks. More
specifically, for any standard formal definition, axiom and theorem that can
be described and deduced in ZFC set theory, there exists a corresponding ‘dual’
version in D-ZFC and vice versa. In particular ZFC set theory is consistent if
and only if D-ZFC is consistent.
1. DUAL NOTIONS AND AXIOMS OF ZERMELO-FRAENKEL SET THEORY WITH
CHOICE WITHIN NGB SET THEORY
In this section we will follow the treatment of E. Mendelson on the con-
struction of the whole framework for classes and sets developed in NBF set
theory [12, Ch. 4].
Von Newmann-Bernays-Go¨del Set Theory is a very special framework in
the sense that it allows the existence of complementary classes, which can
be seen as ‘dual’ classes regarding the meta-class of all classes. Specifically,
we will use the formal symmetry lying in the Axiom of the Existence of the
Complement Class, which asserts that for any class X , there exists a (unique)
dual class X+ satisfying
(∀a)(a ∈ X ↔ a ∉X+),
where a varies over sets [12, Ch. 4, B4].
We will define dual notions of the main structural concepts of NBG Set
Theory based on the former axiom.
DATHEMATICS 3
Let us start with the dual notion of the membership relation ∈, which we
denote by ε. This dembership relation is defined by the following axiom:1
(∀A,B)(AεB ↔ A+ ∈ B+).
In this case, we say that A is a dember (delement) of B.
For the dual notion of set, we analyze the corresponding dual formula:
Md(X) ∶⇔ (∃Y )(XεY ) ⇔ (∃Y )(X
+ ∈ Y +)
⇔ (∃Z)(X+ ∈ Z).
So what it means is that X+ is a sed (dual set), if and only if, its complement
X+ is a set, since Y varies over all classes, if and only if, Y + varies over all
classes.
Now, let us prove that there is a ‘dual’ theory of NBG set theory based on a
special sub-collection of proper classes playing the dual role that sets play in
NBG:
1.1. Dual Notion of Equality. The notion of equality for classes and its dual
are exactly the same:
X =d Y ∶⇔ (∀Z)(ZεX ↔ ZεY )
⇔ (∀Z+)(Z+ ∈X+ ↔ Z+ ∈ Y +)
⇔ (∀W )(W ∈ X+ ↔W ∈ Y +) ∶⇔X+ = Y + ⇔X = Y
1.2. Dual Inclusion. The dual notion of inclusion, namely, dinclusion is de-
fined as usual:
X ⊑ Y ∶⇔ (∀Z)(ZεX → ZεY ).
We express this by saying that X is a subsed of Y .
1.3. Dual Proper Classes. The dual notion of proper class is called d-proper
class and is given by
¬Md(W )⇔ (∀Y )(¬(WεY ))⇔
(∀Y )¬(W + ∈ Y +)⇔ (∀Z)(¬(W + ∈ Z)),
where Z = Y + varies over all classes. So, W is a d-proper class if and only
if W + is a proper class.
Informally, seds have very similar properties as sets, when replacing ∈ by ε.
In addition, since one of the central notions of NBG set theory is the con-
cept of set, we want to understand its behavior within the framework of the
1In most of the cases the name of the dual notions will be given by replacing (resp. adding
to) the first letter of the original name with the letter ‘d’, coming from ‘dual’. For example, the
dual of the membership relation is called ‘dembership relation’.
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ε relation. So, we will focus our attention on the dual versions of the further
axioms regarding sets.
1.4. Dual Axiom T. The dual version of the Axiom T, namely, the Axiom T +
coincides with the corresponding Axiom T due to the following reasons:
X = Y ⇔X+ = Y +⇒ (∀Z)(X+ ∈ Z ↔ Y + ∈ Z)
⇔ (∀W )(X+ ∈W +↔ Y + ∈W +)
⇔ (∀W )(XεW ↔ Y εW ).
The last chain of equivalences hold due to the fact thatW and Z vary over
all classes, if and only if,W + and Z+ so too do.
Besides, it is clear that
(∀A,B)(A = B ↔ A+ = B+).
In conclusion, the Axiom T + states
X = Y ⇒ (∀W )(XεW ↔ Y εW ).
1.5. Dual Predicative Well-formed Formulas. We denote sed variables (i.e.,
symbols which vary only over seds) by lower-case letters and classes by upper-
case letters. So a dual predicative well-formed (dwf) formula is just a w. f.
formula Φ, where all the bound variables are sed variables.
1.6. Dual Pairing Axiom. The dual version of the Pairing Axiom, namely,
Axiom P + is the following:
(∀x)(∀y)(∃z)(∀u)(uεz↔ u = x ∨ u = y).
Now, it is equivalent to the sentence:
(∀x)(∀y)(∃z)(∀u)(u+ ∈ z+↔ u+ = x+ ∨ u+ = y+).
Besides, x, y, z and u vary over seds if and only if x+, y+, z+ and u+ vary
over sets. So, the last expression is equivalent to
(∀x+)(∀y+)(∃z+)(∀u+)(u+ ∈ z+↔ u+ = x+ ∨ u+ = y+),
where all the variables appearing here are set variables. So, if we know
that all symbols Ξ+ vary over sets, then we could eliminate the symbols (−)+
and obtain, in fact, just the classic pairing axiom of NBG. So, the Axiom P + is
just stating that z+ = {x+, y+}, and we will denote this by z = Hx, yI. In other
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words, the Axiom P + states that for any seds x and y, there exists a (uniquely
determined) sed z having as denements exactly x and y.2
1.7. Dual Null Set. For the Axiom N+(Null Sed), let us first note that we can
write the classic Axiom N in the following equivalent form:
(∃X)(∀Y )(¬(Y ∈ X)).
Effectively, the empty set satisfies clearly the former condition due to the
fact that any proper class Z also fulfills ¬(Z ∈ ∅). On the other hand,
a class X satisfying that any class Y does not belong to it, would fulfill, in
particular, the classic condition defining the empty set. Therefore
due to the Class Existence Theorem [12, Prop. 4.4 Ch 4], both should be
the same.
So, let us prove that the corresponding dual version of the former version
of the Axiom T also holds. In fact,
(∃X)(∀Y )(¬(Y εX))⇔
(∃X)(∀Y )(¬(Y + ∈X+))⇔
(∃X)(∀Y +)(¬(Y + ∈ X+))⇔
(∃X+)(∀Y +)(¬(Y + ∈ X+))⇔
(∃X+)(∀Z)(¬(Z ∈X+))⇔
(∃X)(∀Z)(Z ∉ X+).
Now, the last sentence says that there exists a class whose complement is
the empty set, which is true because the universal class V of all sets fulfills
this property.
So, the empty sed is the universal class V . So, the duniversal class containing
all the delements is the empty set.
2In this section we show explicitly the essential constructions and (in some sense similar)
arguments due basically to achieve an axiomatic completeness in our presentation. However,
in the next section we will prove a more general dualization result that requires only minimal
technical requirements, and can be applied far beyond the concrete axiomatization of NBG Set
Theory.
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1.8. Dual Unordered Pairs. We should define a unique value for HX,Y I,
where X and Y are any classes. So, we do this in the natural way:
Z = HX,Y I ∶⇔ Z+ = {X+, Y +}.
Thus, the unordered d-pair is defined as the null sed if one of the classes is
a d-proper class, and it is defined by the Axiom P + if both classes are seds.
Besides, by definition we get the equality (HX,Y I)+ = {X+, Y +}.
In addition, we define the ordered d-pair of X and Y , ⟪X,Y ⟫ as
HHXI, HX,Y II.
It is quite simple to prove that this notion fulfills the corresponding dual prop-
erty that an ordered pair satisfies, i.e., two ordered d-pairs are equal if and
only if the first and the second components coincide. Similarly, one defines
ordered d-pairs with n components. Again, from this definition we can prove
that (⟪X,Y ⟫)+ = ⟨X+, Y +⟩.
1.9. Dual Axiom for the Existence of a Membership Relation. The axiom
of the existence of the ε−relation states that
(∃X)(∀u)(∀v)(⟪u, v⟫εX ↔ uεv).
Now, it is equivalent to
(∃X+)(∀u+)(∀v+)(⟨u+, v+⟩ ∈ X+↔ u+ ∈ v+).
So, this sentence shows the existence of a class whose complement is the
∈-relation class, which is true, since the complement of the ∈-relation fulfills
the statement above.
1.10. Dual Existence of Intersections. The axiom of the existence of dinter-
sections of seds states that
(∀X)(∀Y )(∃Z)(∀u)(uεZ ↔ uεX ∧ uεY ).
It is equivalent to the following statement:
(∀X+)(∀Y +)(∃Z+)(∀u+)(u+ ∈ Z+ ↔ u+ ∈X+ ∧ u+ ∈ Y +),
where X+, Y + and Z+ vary over classes and u+ varies over sets. Now,
the last statement is equivalent to the classic Axiom of the existence of the
intersection class of two classes. Moreover, if we denote this new class by
Z =X ⊓ Y , then it holds
X ⊓ Y = (X+ ∩ Y +)+.
Analogously, there is a notion of dunion of classes denoted by X ⊔X satis-
fying
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X ⊔ Y = (X+ ∪ Y +)+.
1.11. Dual Notion of Complement. The notion of the domplement of a sed
is given by the statement:
(∀X)(∃Z)(∀u)(uεZ↔ ¬(uεX)),
which is equivalent to
(∀X+)(∃Z+)(∀u+)(u+ ∈ Z+↔ u+ ∉X+)).
Where again X+ and Z+ vary over classes and u+ varies over sets. As
before, the former sentence is equivalent to the axiom of the existence of the
complement class. Besides, if we denote this class by Xd, then
Xd = Z = (Z+)+ =X+.
So, both notions coincides.
Note that due to the definition of equality, all the classes defined before are
uniquely determined, which justifies the introduction of the new symbols.
1.12. Dual Existence of Domains of Classes. The sentence guaranteeing
the existence of d−domains of classes is the following:
(∀X)(∃Z)(∀u)(uεZ↔ (∃v)(⟪u, v⟫εX).
It is equivalent to
(∀X+)(∃Z+)(∀u+)(u+ ∈ Z+ ↔ (∃v+)(⟨u+, v+⟩ ∈X+),
where X+ and Z+ vary over classes and u+ varies over sets.
This is equivalent to the Domain Existence Axiom. If we denote this new
class by Z = D+(X), then
D
+(X) = (D(X+))+,
where D(−) denotes the complement of a class.
Now, it is easy to prove the last three dual versions of the Axioms of Class
Existence [12, §1 Ch. 4], namely
(∀X)(∃Z)(∀u)(∀v)(⟪u, v⟫εZ ↔ uεX),
(∀X)(∃Z)(∀u)(∀v)(∀w)(⟪u, v,w⟫εZ ↔ ⟪u,w, v⟫εX),
and
(∀X)(∃Z)(∀u)(∀v)(∀w)(⟪u, v,w⟫εZ ↔ ⟪v,w,u⟫εX).
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Besides, there is a natural dual notion of difference of sets, defined as d-
difference of X and Y , i.e.,
X ⋋ Y ∶=X ⊓ Y d.
1.13. Dual Class Existence Theorem. The general D-Class Existence Theo-
rem (DCET) is the following:
Let Φ(wα,⋯,wl,X1,⋯,Xm, Y1,⋯, Yn) be a dwf formula, where the only
relation symbols allowed are = and ε, the bound (seds) variables are exactly
wα,⋯,wl, and the free variables occur among X1,⋯,Xm, Y1,⋯, Yn. Then
⊢ (∃Z)(∀x1)⋯(∀xm)(⟪x1,⋯, xm⟫εZ ↔ Φ(x1,⋯, xm, Y1,⋯, Yn)).
Now, there is a predicative well-formed formula Φ+, corresponding to Φ,
constructed in the following natural way: Φ+ is obtained from Φ replacing the
relation symbol ε by ∈ and replacing the bounded sed variables by bounded
set variables with the same names.
So, it can easily be seen that the last sentence is equivalent to the following
one:
(∃Z+)(∀x+
1
)⋯(∀x+m)(⟨x
+
1
,⋯, x+m⟩ ∈ Z
+
↔ Φ
+(x+
1
,⋯, x+m, Y
+
1
,⋯, Y +n )),
which is a theorem due to the general Class Existence Theorem applied to
the predicative wf Φ+(w+α,⋯,w
+
l ,X
+
1
,⋯,X+m, Y
+
1
,⋯, Y +n ).
1.14. Dual Cartesian Product. The definition of dual Cartesian product of
X and Y is the following:
(∀x)(xεX ⊠ Y ↔ (∃u)(∃v)(x = ⟪u, v⟫ ∧ uεX ∧ vεY )).
This class exists in virtue to the DCET and it holds
X ⊠ Y = (X+ × Y +)+.
Similarly, one defines Cartesian products for more than two classes. Be-
sides, the dual notion of relation is the concept of delation, namely, X is a
(binary) delation if X ⊑ ∅[2] ∶= ∅ ⊠ ∅. Based on this concept, we can directly
define the dual notions concerning relations,e.g. X is an irreflexive delation
of Y , XIrr+Y :
Rel+(X) ∧ (∀y)(yεY → ¬(⟪y, y⟫εX)).
Similarly, we can defineXTr+Y (X is a transitive delation on Y ),XPart+Y
(X partially d-orders Y ), XCon+Y (X is a connected delation of Y ) and
XTot+Y (X totally d-orders Y ) and XWe+Y (X well-d-orders Y ). So, they
also fulfill the corresponding dual properties, e.g. XTot+Y if and only if
X+TotY +.
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In general, the following dual notions exist also due to the DCET:
1.15. Dual Notion of Power Class. By the DCET and the definition of equal-
ity, given a class X , there is a unique Dower class of X , denoted by P+(X)
containing as delements all subseds of X:
⊢ (∀X)(∃1Z)(∀y)(yεZ ↔ y ⊑X).
1.16. Dual Axiom U . The Axiom U+ states that
(∀x)(∃y)(∀u)(uεy↔ (∃v)(uεv ∧ vεx)).
As usual, re-writing this statement with the classic notation we can see that
it is equivalent to the corresponding Axiom U . Besides, we can easily prove
that
for any sed X
⊔X = (∪(X+))+.
1.17. Dual Notion and Axiom of Sum Class. Similarly, by using the DCET,
one proves the existence of a dual notion of Sum class, namely, for any class
X there exists a class Z = ⊔(X) (the D-Sum Class) such that
(∀y)(yε ⊔X ↔ (∃v)(yεv ∧ vεX)).
1.18. Dual Axiom W . Moreover, the dual version for the Axiom W (Power
Set), i.e., the AxiomW + (Dower Sed) is the following
(∀x)(∃y)(∀u)(uεy↔ u ⊑ x).
This sentence again holds because it is basically equivalent to the standard
Axiom W (Power Set).
In particular, it is a formal computation to prove
⊢ P+(HV, HV II) = HV, HV I, HV, HV II, HHV III,
where V denotes the empty sed, i.e., the universal class.
1.19. Dual Axiom S. It is a straightforward fact to state and to prove the
Axiom S+.
1.20. Dual Axiom R. The same holds for the Axiom R+ in terms of a univocal
delation Un+(X).
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1.21. Dual Axiom of Infinity. The dual version of the Axiom I (Axiom of
Infinity) is the Axiom I+ (D-Axiom of infinity):
(∃x)(V εx ∧ (∀y)(yεx→ y ⊔ HyIεx)).
Informally, it states that there exists a (dual-)infinite sed, i.e., a class whose
complement is an infinite set.
1.22. Dual Axiom of Regularity. The dual version of the Axiom of Regularity
(Axiom D) is the Axiom D+:
∀X(∃W (WεX)→ ∃y(yεX ∧ ∀z(zεy → ¬(zεX)))).
Again, it can be proved by using the corresponding form of the Axiom of
Regularity.
1.23. Dual Axiom of Choice. Finally, there is a dual version of the Axiom of
Choice, namely, the Axiom of D-Choice, stating that if x is a sed of pairwise d-
disjoint seds, there exists a (d-choice) sed c containing exactly one denement
of each of the seds of x. It is a direct consequence of (the corresponding
classic version of) the Axiom of Choice.
Equivalently, we can explicitly state the dual form of Zorn’s Lemma with
the former terminology:
(∀x)(∀y)((yPartx) ∧ (∀u)(u ⊑ x ∧ yTotu→ (∃v)(vεx
∧(∀w)(wεu→ w = u∨⟪w,v⟫εy))) → (∃v)(vεx∧(∀w)(wεx → ¬(⟪v,w⟫εy)))),
which is equivalent to Zorn’s Lemma, because all the variables vary over
seds and then its dual expressions vary over sets. So, due to the dual proper-
ties of each of the delations expressed in the sentence, one basically obtains
the corresponding classic form of Zorn’s lemma by reading ‘dually’ this specific
D-Zorn’s Lemma.
Finally, D-NBG Sed theory will be defined as the first-order (sub-) theory
(of NBG) having as a logic axioms the standard 5 logic axioms of a first-order
theory, as proper axioms we will consider the former dual versions of all the
original axioms of NBG and as logical rules (as usual) Modus Ponens and
Generalization [12, Ch. 2 §3].
2. A MORE GENERAL DUALIZATION THEOREM
In the last section we developed explicitly all the necessary basic (dual-
)notions and facts based essentially on the existence of an unique comple-
mentary class, and due to expository reasons as well. Explicitly, The fact
that ZFC Set Theory is (one of) the most accepted foundational frameworks
for ‘modern’ mathematics compels us to present the minimal explicit results,
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since our work has direct implications on the identification of the seminal
causes of the (in)consistency of such framework. Now, as the reader may sus-
pect the dual semantic and syntactic core properties lying behind most of the
former statements do not depend on the existence of all the axioms of NBG
(resp. ZFC).
Effectively, Let L be a first-order language with equality and one binary
operation symbol n. Let T be a first-order theory, including an axiom Ac
guaranteeing the existence of an unique object, which plays the role of a
formal ‘complement’ with respect ton, i.e.,
(∀a)(anX ↔ anXd).
Let us define a new binary relation symbolv by the sentence
(∀A,B)(Av B↔ Ad n Bd).
Let Ld be the language L ∪ {v} ∖ {n}. Let Φ be a L−formula. We define
the Ld−formula Φ(d) by replacing in Φ every occurrence ofn byv.
With the former terminology we can state our general Dualization Theo-
rem.
Theorem 2.1. Let Γ be a L−theory which includes the axiom Ac and let Φ be a
L−sentence. Let Γ(d) be the corresponding L(d)−theory consisting of the duals of
the elements of Γ. Then, Γ ⊢L Φ if and only if Γ
(d)
⊢L(d) Φ
(d). Furthermore, if
M is a L−model of Γ, then the natural correspondence induced by the operator
(−)(d) induces an isomorphism between M and M (d), where M (d) is exactlyM
as set and the interpretation ofv is given by means of the original interpretation
ofn and the complements.
Proof. Let H1,⋯,Hn be a L−proof of Γ ⊢L Φ i.e., Hm = Φ and for any i =
1,⋯,m − 1, Hi is either an axiom of ZCF, an element of Γ, or it is a wff
that can be deduced by a valid inference rule from the former Hj − s It is
straightforward to see that H1,⋯,Hm is a L−proof of Γ ⊢L Φ, if and only if
H
(d)
1
,⋯,H
(d)
m is a L
(d)
−proof of Γ(d) ⊢L(d) Φ
(d). On the other hand, one can
directly verify that the operator (−)(d) is its own inverse, and therefore it is
an isomorphism.

3. DATHEMATICS
Let us call ‘standard’ (or set-theoretic) Mathematics for all formal mathe-
matical theories which are grounded in ZFC set theory, for instance, Real and
Complex Analysis, Geometry, Algebra, Number theory, Topology and Category
Theory. So, we will name Dathematics for the family of all dual versions of the
(former) modern theories, where all the subsequent concepts and theorems
describing properties among them are expressed and grounded by D-ZFC.
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Here, D-ZFC is, strictly speaking, a first-order logic dual sub-theory of NBG,
i.e., in the same way that NBG is a conservative extension of ZFC, so too is
D-NBG a conservative extension of (the corresponding theory) D-ZFC.3 In par-
ticular, the fundamental objects of Dathematics are (a specific sub-collection
of) proper classes, i.e. seds.
Furthermore, the empty-sed is the universal class V and the universal d-
proper class V + is the empty set. So, in Dathematics, the quantitative prop-
erties in classical sense are reversed. Besides, it is a natural meta-fact that
(classic) mathematics and dathematics are (syntactically) meta-isomorphic,
i.e., for any concept, theory and conjecture in (standard) mathematics there
exists a symmetric d-concept, d-theory and d-conjecture in dathematics with
equivalent formal properties, and vice versa. For instance, we can prove the
following syntactic meta-correspondence:
Theorem 3.1. Let C be a conjecture in ZFC (seen as a sub-theory of NBG) given
by a wff φ. Then there exists a corresponding dual conjecture C+ in D-ZFC given
by the dwf φ+, such that C is provable in ZFC if and only if C+ is provable in
D-ZFC, i.e., ZFC ⊢ φ if and only if D −ZFC ⊢ φ+. Moreover, if P is a proof of
C in ZFC, then the natural dual version of P in D-ZFC, namely P +, is a proof
of C+ and vice versa. In other words, (standard) Mathematics and Dathematics
are meta-isomorphic theories. In particular, they are equiconsistent.
Proof. The argument is similar to the one of the former theorem but with a
small additional consideration. Effectively, let P = {P1,⋯, Pm} be a proof of
φ in ZFC. Then, based on the constructions done in Sect. 1, one can see that
each P +i is d-wff (i.e. a wff with respect to seds) and P
+ = {P +
1
,⋯, P +m} is a
valid proof of φ+ in the theory D-ZFC, which has the same inference rules of
ZFC. The converse is straightforward. So, all (dual) well-formed statements
that can be syntactically deduced from one theory, can be (dually) mirrowed
into the other one. In conclusion, Mathematics and Dathematics are in this
sense syntactically meta-isomorphic. 
In particular, there exists a dual theory of the classical ZFC Set theory which
can also be called ZFC Sed Theory.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The fact that set-theoretic Mathematics (based on ZFC (resp. NBG) Set
Theory) and Dathematics are meta-isomorphic, and, in particular, one is con-
sistent if and only if the other one is also consistent; together with the fact
that the semantics for Dathematics are canonically given by ‘very big’ objects
(i.e. proper classes); show that the cause of the Russell’s paradox in Naive Set
3The dual NBG first-order logic theory is just NBG itself considered with the former dual ax-
ioms (which are in fact, theorems of the theory) and the former conventions about quantification
over classes and seds, using explicitly only two binary relation symbols, i.e., = and ε.
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Theory is not only a matter of the ‘size’ of the corresponding foundational ob-
jects (e.g. sets), but it also lies within a deeper conceptual level in the formal
framework in which sets are defined.
Effectively, we have shown here that there is a formally identical version
of standard Mathematics (i.e. Dathematics) structurally based on exactly the
same type of objects that turn out to be avoided in NBG because of inconsis-
tency issues, namely, proper classes. In particular, both formal frameworks are
‘equi-consistent’, and both also simultaneously have, from a quantitative per-
spective, ‘diametrically opposite’ seminal objects, i.e., sets and proper classes.
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